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Regardless of how the UK leaves the European Union and what final timetable it adopts, Brexit 
has influenced the British debate on security policy, and may have implications for Britain’s 
involvement in NATO’s defence and deterrence strategy towards Russia. The United Kingdom 
plays an important role on NATO’s north-eastern flank. London has deployed British troops to 
the NATO battlegroups in Estonia and Poland, and it is expanding its military cooperation with 
Norway in securing the maritime areas of the North Atlantic. The UK has also bolstered its mil-
itary presence in Romania. After leaving the European Union, London will still be involved in 
the security of Northern and Central & Eastern Europe. However in the future, Britain’s strong 
military footprint on NATO’s eastern flank may be challenged by the increased activity of Brit-
ish armed forces beyond Europe as part of the ‘Global Britain’ concept, or by a change in the 
priorities of Britain’s security policy by the Labour Party, which wants to focus to a greater 
degree on global threats and the UN’s peacekeeping operations.
The UK on NATO’s eastern flank
The United Kingdom (alongside France) is NA-
TO’s most important member after the United 
States. It plays a leading role in NATO’s nuclear 
deterrence, collective defence and out-of-area 
operations. It advocates strong trans-Atlantic 
ties and a continued US military presence in 
Europe, and develops very close bilateral mili-
tary co-operation with the US, which consists of 
high interoperability between both countries’ 
conventional and strategic forces, cooperation 
between their intelligence services, and cooper-
ation between their defence industries1. Britain 
is thus a very important ally for the countries 
on NATO’s eastern flank. However, the east-
ern flank is only one of many areas of the UK’s 
1 The House of Commons Defence Committee, ‘Indis-
pensable allies: US, UK and NATO defence relations’, 
Eighth Report of Session 2017-19, 19 June 2018; https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmd-
fence/387/387.pdf 
global military involvement. London maintains 
considerable forces in bases scattered outside 
the NATO area, from the Falklands to the Middle 
East, which latter remains an important area of 
British military activity.
London sees Russia as a strategic challenge 
– a state which is increasingly aggressive, au-
thoritarian and nationalist, and which defines 
itself in its opposition to the West. The United 
Kingdom’s national security strategy (adopted 
in 2015) identified four long-term challenges: an 
increase in the threats from terrorism, extremism 
and instability; the return of state-based threats 
and the intensification of inter-state rivalry; cy-
ber-threats; and the erosion of the rules-based 
international order2. Russia’s policy is mentioned 
as the main challenge in the area of  risks asso-
2 HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic 
Defence and Security Review 2015, November 2015; https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Stra-
tegic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf 
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ciated with inter-state rivalry, and as one of the 
challenges to compliance with international law3. 
Britain’s perception of Russia in recent years has 
been influenced not only by the modernisation 
of the Russian armed forces and the restoration 
of its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area, 
but also by the use of ‘active measures’, such as 
the Russian disinformation campaigns, and the 
special services’ actions in the United Kingdom 
(the use of the ‘Novichok’ combat nerve agent in 
Salisbury in 2018)4. For these reasons, the United 
Kingdom is one of a group of NATO members 
calling for a strong stance against Russia’s ac-
tions, which can for example be seen in British 
support for the strengthening of collective de-
fence and the eastern flank.
In military terms, it is Britain’s military capability 
and the willingness to use it which counts most 
for the countries on NATO’s eastern flank. The 
United Kingdom has the largest defence budget 
(c. US$60bn, i.e. 2.1% of its 2018 GDP) and the 
fifth largest armed forces (c. 150,000 troops) of 
the European allies5. It is a nuclear power with 
a high level of force projection capability and 
capacity for commanding larger operations. 
Since 2014, it has guaranteed a significant con-
tribution to NATO’s presence on the eastern 
3 However, London does recognise the need to cooperate 
with Russia on the UN Security Council, for example in 
the fight against terrorism.
4 N. Walker, B. Smith, ‘Russian Federation activity in the 
UK and globally’, House of Commons Library, 26 June 
2018, https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/Research-
Briefing/Summary/CDP-2018-0159 
5 This also allots c. 27% of the defence budget to the 
procurement of new armament and military equip-
ment. NATO, ‘Defense Expenditure of NATO Coun-
tries (2011-2018)’, press release 10 July 2018, https://
www.nato.int /nato_static_f l2014/assets /pdf/pd-
f_2018_07/20180709_180710-pr2018-91-en.pdf 
flank, being involved in live and command-post 
military exercises, the enhanced forward pres-
ence (eFP) of NATO forces, and airspace polic-
ing. In this way the UK can complement the 
actions of the US, which has the largest contin-
gent of forces on the eastern flank. Britain also 
plays an important role in the reformed NATO 
Response Force, with air (fighter, aerial refu-
elling and early warning aircraft), naval (ships 
in NATO’s standing maritime groups) and land 
components, as one of the Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force (VJTF) framework nations6.
As part of NATO’s collective defence, the 
north-eastern flank is of strategic importance 
for London, as it is directly related to the se-
curity of the British Isles. The focus of British 
military activity here is the expansion of de-
fence cooperation with Norway in securing the 
maritime areas of the North Atlantic, including 
anti-submarine warfare and exercises by Brit-
ish marines in Northern Norway7. In the Baltic 
Sea region, the United Kingdom is a framework 
nation of NATO’s battalion-size battlegroup in 
Estonia, where it has deployed its mechanised 
infantry battalion (numbering around 700 sol-
diers). 130 British soldiers are also included in 
the US-led battlegroup in Poland, complement-
ing the US forces stationed there. Furthermore, 
the United Kingdom participates in airspace 
policing over the Baltic states (NATO’s Baltic Air 
Policing) as well as in regional exercises such as 
Saber Strike, BALTOPS and Arctic Challenge. UK 
officers have also been seconded to regional 
command structures in Poland: the Headquar-
6 The British contribution to the VJTF’s land component 
numbered 1000 soldiers in 2016 and 3000 soldiers in 2017 
(command of VJTF). UK has also pledged to contribute 
1000 in 2020. Parliament, ‘NATO Armed Forces: Written 
question 35698’, Publications & records, 26 April 2016, 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/writ 
ten-questions-answers-statements/written-question/
Commons/2016-04-26/35698/ 
7 Ministry of Defence, ‘UK and Norway defence ministers 
plan sub-hunting co-operation’, 3 May 2018, https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-norway-defence-
ministers-plan-sub-hunting-co-operation; idem, ‘Defence 
Secretary Announces New Arctic Defence Strategy’, 30 
September 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
defence-secretary-announces-new-defence-arctic-strategy 
In NATO’s collective defence, the north- 
-eastern flank is of strategic importance 
for London, as it is directly related to the 
security of the United Kingdom. 
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ters of the Multinational Corps Northeast in 
Szczecin (MNC NE) and the Multinational Di-
vision North East in Elbląg (MND NE)8. In ad-
dition, the north-eastern flank’s importance in 
British security policy is demonstrated by the 
political and military consultations with the 
Nordic and Baltic countries, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Germany which have been held 
since 2010 in the Northern Group format. The 
Nordic and Baltic states are interested in closer 
military cooperation with Britain, and partici-
pate in the UK-led military cooperation format 
known as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)9. 
In military terms, the United Kingdom is virtual-
ly absent from the Visegrád Group states – the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary (it treats 
Poland as part of the Baltic Sea region). One 
exception to this was the British-Czech military 
training and education programme which oper-
ated in 2016-201910. In turn, on the south-eastern 
flank, the United Kingdom has strengthened its 
military activity in Romania due to that coun-
try’s increasing importance to the security of 
the Black Sea region since the annexation of 
Crimea. This activity has included the second-
ment of personnel to the Headquarters of the 
8 The United Kingdom is planning to participate in the 
newly established Multinational Division North, locat-
ed in Denmark and Latvia. NATO, ‘NATO’s Enhanced 
Forward Presence’, factsheet, February 2019 https://
www.nato.int /nato_static_f l2014/assets /pdf/pd-
f_2019_02/20190213_1902-factsheet_efp_en.pdf
9 The JEF strength can reach 10,000 soldiers. 80-90% of 
the troops will be provided by British forces. The oth-
er participants are the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
10 British Embassy in Prague, ‘Czech and British armed 
forces tighten cooperation’, 1 December 2016: https://
w w w.gov.uk /government /news /czech-and-br it-
ish-armed-forces-tighten-cooperation 
Multinational Division South East in Bucharest 
(MND SE), as well as participation in policing 
Romanian airspace and in military exercises11. 
Romania and Bulgaria want to retain British 
interest in the Black Sea region (especially the 
Royal Navy presence).
British security policy after Brexit 
Following the vote for Brexit, a discussion start-
ed in the UK on the future direction of the 
country’s security policy. Both the ruling Con-
servative Party and the opposition Labour Party 
have called for a more proactive approach by 
Britain in this area.
The Conservatives have responded to Brex-
it with the ‘Global Britain’ concept, which in-
volves exploiting British potential in the fields 
of diplomacy, the military, finance & trade, and 
development aid to strengthen its position on 
the international stage12. In the field of secu-
rity, strengthening Britain’s network of allianc-
es and partnerships is expected to be of key 
importance. In the multilateral formats, NATO 
is expected to play a leading role; in bilateral 
cooperation, the US will have top priority (fol-
lowed in succession by France, Germany, Japan 
and Australia)13. Collective defence in NATO 
and the military presence on the eastern flank 
occupies an important place in the Tories’ vi-
sion of post-Brexit security policy. At the same 
time, however, another important element of 
11 P. Brummell, ‘UK-Romania defence cooperation’, Foreign 
& Commonwealth Office, 2 August 2017: https://blogs.
fco.gov.uk/paulbrummell/2017/08/02/uk-romania-de-
fence-cooperation/ 
12 According to the Conservative manifesto, the decision 
to leave the EU represented the choice of a truly glob-
al role for the UK. The Conservative and Unionist Party, 
Forward, Together: Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and 
a Prosperous Future, Manifesto 2017: https: //s3.eu-
west-2.amazonaws.com/conservative-party-manifestos/
Forward+Together + - + + Our plan + for + a + Stronger + 
Britain + and + a + + More Prosperous .... pdf 
13 Ministry of Defence, the Foreign & Commonwealth Of-
fice, The UK’s International Defence Engagement Strategy, 
2017: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads /system/uploads /at tachment_data / f i le /5 
96968/06032017_Def_Engag_Strat_2017DaSCREEN.pdf 
In connection with Brexit, both the Con-
servative government and the Labour op-
position have advocated a more proactive 
stance in the UK’s security policy.
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the ‘Global Britain’ concept is the activation of 
the UK’s non-European security policy and the 
strengthening of British forces ‘east of Suez’, i.e. 
the Middle East and South-East Asia. In 2018-
2019 the United Kingdom opened new bases in 
Bahrain and Oman14. Discussions are being held 
on the possibility of building a permanent na-
val base in either Singapore or Brunei, a move 
which is associated with the UK’s involvement 
in the American policy of containing China15. In 
a well-publicised speech in February, the British 
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson stressed 
the importance of the traditional threats result-
ing from competition among the great pow-
ers for spheres of influence, mentioning China 
alongside Russia16.
The ‘Global Britain’ concept has raised doubts 
among some commentators and experts who 
have declared it to be a political phantom cal-
culated to boost the UK’s international prestige, 
which has been tarnished as a result of Brexit. 
In the military dimension, the often-heard ar-
14 In 2018 around 10,000 British soldiers (7% of the total 
forces) were stationed overseas on a UK’s global network 
of bases (located in different countries and overseas ter-
ritories) and within multinational command structures: 
6850 in Europe (of which 85% were in Germany and Cy-
prus), 290 in Asia, 830 in North Africa and the Middle 
East, 410 in sub-Saharan Africa, 1190 in North America, 
30 in Central America and the Caribbean, 330 in South 
America and 50 in Oceania. These figures do not include 
participation in operations. Ministry of Defence, ‘Quar-
terly service personnel statistics: 2018’, 15 February 
2018; https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quar-
terly-service-personnel-statistics-2018 
15 J. Hemmings, J. Rogers, ‘The South China Sea: Why It Mat-
ters to ‘Global Britain’’, The Henry Jackson Society, Janu-
ary 2019; https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/01/HJS-South-China-Sea-Report-web-1.pdf 
16 G. Williamson, ‘Defence in Global Britain’, Ministry of 
Defense, 11 February 2019; https://www.gov.uk/govern-
ment/speeches/defence-in-global-britain
gument is that the plan to significantly increase 
Britain’s military presence outside the NATO 
area is detached from a reality in which British 
forces are struggling with a number of matériel 
and personnel shortages. Concerns have been 
expressed about the overstretch of limited re-
sources, at a time when the UK does not have 
the potential to strengthen its forces in South-
East Asia with the aim of containing China 
while simultaneously playing a leading role in 
deterring Russia. In 2018 the British parliament 
criticised the ‘Global Britain’ concept as a col-
lection of aspirations, not a real strategy17.
The Labour Party has defined Brexit as the 
greatest challenge to the UK’s global role the 
since World War II18. The ‘Global Britain’ con-
cept in Labour’s version also focuses on in-
vestments in diplomacy, the armed forces and 
development aid19. However, in contrast to the 
Conservative vision, Labour presents a vision of 
British leadership based on multilateral solu-
tions and greater activity in the United Nations. 
It recognises global warming and migration as 
the priority challenges; NATO, collective de-
fence and the special relationship with the US 
are pushed into the background. The Labour 
Party primarily wishes to act on the basis of the 
UK’s permanent membership of the UN Securi-
ty Council, and has announced that it intends 
to significantly increase British participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations.
Controversy over the Labour Party’s post- 
-Brexit vision of security policy stems from its 
far-reaching departures from the party’s previ-
ous line. The Labour Party’s programme in this 
area has been  influenced by the views of its 
leader Jeremy Corbyn, who has indicated that 
he would advocate for nuclear disarmament, 
17 Parliament, Global Britain, 12 March 2018; https://publi 
cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/ 
780/78002.htm 
18 N. Griffith, ‘Nia Griffith on Labour’s Defence Policy’, 
RUSI, 25 June 2018; https://rusi.org/event/nia-griffith-la-
bour-defence-policy 
19 The Labour Party, For The Many Not The Few: Manifesto 
2017; https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 
10/labour-manifesto-2017.pdf
In a well-publicised speech from February 
2019, Williamson stressed the importance 
of traditional threats resulting from com-
petition between the great powers.
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support dialogue with Russia and China among 
others, and block British participation in NATO 
and US operations which are not authorised 
by the UN Security Council, as in the case of 
the intervention in Iraq in 2003, and the air 
raids on the Islamic State’s positions in Syria20. 
On the other hand the moderate faction of the 
Labour Party, as well as the UK’s allies (particu-
larly the United States) would probably strive 
to stop such far-reaching changes. In its 2017 
election manifesto the Labour Party endorsed 
the extension of the nuclear deterrence pro-
gramme, despite opposition from Corbyn.
Brexit’s impact on Britain’s presence  
on NATO’s eastern flank
After leaving the EU, the UK’s security policy 
will be an important tool for strengthening 
its position on the international stage. A Con-
servative government will continue to invest 
in high-priority military cooperation with the 
United States and it would be highly likely to 
continue its commitment to the strategy of de-
terrence and defence on NATO’s eastern flank. 
The Conservatives will seek to reconcile the 
tasks of defending the UK’s territory and col-
lective defence with increasing military activity 
worldwide, with the aim of partially offsetting 
its withdrawal from the EU. Brexit should not 
affect the UK’s perception of Russia, although 
in connection with the expected economic dif-
ficulties resulting from leaving the common 
market, London may become more interested 
20 Chatham House, ‘Jeremy Corbyn on Labour’s Defence 
and Foreign Policy Priorities’, 12 May 2017, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=VGzPo8Wx1n0 
in attracting investment from and developing 
trade with Moscow.
A positive signal for the north-eastern flank is 
the announcement of further reinforcements 
(Wildcat and Apache helicopters) for the UK-led 
NATO battlegroup in Estonia, and of the organi-
sation of JEF exercises in the Baltic Sea region in 
2019, and the decision to keep 250 soldiers and 
storage facilities with armament and military 
equipment in Germany. The latter will enable 
the rapid redeployment of sizeable forces on 
the continent, for example in case of a threat 
from Russia21. Due to the insufficient military 
potential ‘east of Suez’, in South-East Asia Lon-
don will probably rely on spot reinforcements 
of actions undertaken by its allies, especially 
the US, and the key partners: Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia.
However, we cannot rule out a possible rise 
in ‘imperial nostalgia’ in British politics, as 
manifested in the ‘Global Britain’ concept. At 
that point it might be increasingly difficult 
for the Central & Eastern European countries 
to convince London that its strategic interests 
are more closely linked to the eastern flank of 
NATO than, for example, South-East Asia. This 
is especially true as tension between London & 
Brussels over Brexit negotiations and possible 
new disputes after the UK leaves the EU could 
make the British political elite increasingly re-
luctant to become more involved in European 
security. This might lead to calls for France and 
Germany to take greater responsibility for secu-
rity on the continent22.
21 In 2010-18 UK reduced the number of its troops in Ger-
many from 19,100 to 3500. In 2019 the 20th Armoured 
Brigade in Paderborn will finally be relocated to the 
UK. Ministry of Defence, The British Army’s footprint in 
Germany, 5 October 2018; https://www.parliament.uk/
documents/20181005_British_Army_Footprint_Germa-
ny_SofS_to_Chairman.pdf; Idem, ‘Apache and Wildcat 
to touch down in Estonia as the UK bolsters its commit-
ment to NATO’, 13 February 2019; https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/apache-and-wildcat-to-touch-down-
in-estonia-as-uk-bolsters-its-commitment-to-nato--2 
22 There is some risk that in the future the United Kingdom 
could treat a continental military presence as a bargain-
ing chip in negotiations on other issues.
The JEF exercises in the Baltic Sea region 
and the reinforcement of the British forces 
in Estonia are positive signals for the north-
east flank.
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It is possible that as a result of leaving the EU, 
political changes may come about in the United 
Kingdom which will affect the British presence 
on NATO’s eastern flank. In the near future, the 
confusion associated with Brexit may lead to 
the Labour Party coming to power, with Jeremy 
Corbyn as a prime minister who would be reluc-
tant to reinforce the eastern flank of NATO, and 
could support dialogue with Russia. A Labour 
government could also be interested in limiting 
military engagement on NATO’s eastern flank 
in order to reinforce UN peacekeeping efforts. 
Brexit has also activated supporters of another 
independence referendum in Scotland, which 
in the long term may bring about its secession. 
This would weaken the United Kingdom’s eco-
nomic, demographic and military potential, 
most likely in connection with the need to di-
vide and transfer some British military assets 
to Scottish control, and to relocate British nu-
clear-powered ballistic missile submarines out 
of Scotland, together with the construction of 
new infrastructure23.
23 J. Black, A. Hall, K. Cox, M. Kepe, E. Silfversten, ‘Defense 
and security after Brexit: Understanding the possible 
implications of the UK’s decision to leave the EU - Over-
view report’, RAND 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1786z1.html 
In addition, in the short and medium term 
Brexit will weaken Britain economically, which 
could aggravate the British armed forces’ cur-
rent problems. These include the stagnation 
of the defence budget (in 2011-18 expenditure 
fell from 2.4% to 2.1% of GDP), a decline in the 
overall size of the armed forces and personnel 
shortages, wear and tear on the equipment, 
and delays in implementing rearmament pro-
grammes. In addition, the depreciation of the 
pound negatively affects the costs of importing 
military equipment. In 2018 the Royal Air Force 
and Navy were operating the smallest numbers 
of key combat systems in decades: 136 oper-
ational fighters and 19 large ships (destroyers 
and frigates) respectively24. Difficulties with fi-
nancing and personnel & materiel may translate 
into less overseas activity by the armed forces. 
Under these conditions, any rapid and signifi-
cant increase in the UK’s military presence, in 
Europe or in other parts of the world, could 
pose a serious challenge.
24 Ministry of Defence, ‘UK armed forces formations and 
equipment 2018’, National Statistics 26 July 2018, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-armed-
forces-equipment-and-formations-2018 
